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BY PAPERWORK:
A DAY
JUSTICE
COURT
IN BOURBON
SCRIBE
By Michael

C. Scardaville

IN THE LIFE OF A
MEXICO
CITY
University

of South Caroiina

After recounting his seven years of loyal and unfailing service as a scribe (escribano) in Mexico City, Mariano Espinosa proceeded to express his concerns to the
magistrates of the Sala del Crirnen, the high criminal court ofNew Spain. In a
1795 petition for a remunerated appointment in the Sala, he complained about
"the onerous duties of (his current) position, working throughout the day and
with an incessant and daily fatigue (and) ... a very limited income."
night?
Disappointed by the ministers' unwillingness to grant his request, Espinosa submitted a second petition three years later in which he explained the physical and
financial burdens of his job in more graphic terms. After reminding the magis?
trates of the high court that he has been an escribano "without any salary save
for the immense work, travails, inconveniences
and miseries that the criminal
justice system produces, which is well-known to the Ministers (of the court),"
he then described his typical daily duties as escribano:
from before eight until after eleven in the morning, this subordinate official is
present to assist his magistrate with the expected respect and decorum: subsequently working in the houses of the Lord Ministers, he continues dispatching
the serious and minor criminal cases as well as the other important tasks until he
leaves at one, two, or three o'clock in the afternoon. Without more than one or
two hours of rest, he returns to the office of the Lord Minister to assist in con?
tinuing the responsibilities of his occupation until the evening prayer. Afterwards
he assists the above Ministers or their ward police officials (alcaldes de Quartel) on
their evening patrols until ten, eleven, or twelve o'clock, since it commonly happens that incidents of homicides, aggravated assaults, robberies, and other serious
crimes, which one cannot avoid noticing, occur in these late hours. It happens,
moreover, that more crimes are committed on holidays, because of the increase
of public drunkenness, than on workdays so that the need to locate witnesses and
undertake judicial investigations further deprives one ofthe short rest period that
is left.1
Shall we dismiss these comments as the kind of hyperbole that historians of
colonial Mexico and Spanish America have come to expect in petitions to the
government, or is there any substance to Espinosa's claims? And if indeed he did
not exaggerate, then what do his quotidian tasks and workload tell us about the
municipal criminal justice system, especially the nature of judicial proceedings,
at a critical time of rapid urban growth, expanding poverty, and government and
elite fears of social disorder and popular unrest in the capital ofthe Viceroyalty of
New Spain? While I am not able to reconstruct Espinosa's particular work routine
from the existing records, it is possible to assess his petitions, and ultimately the
nature of criminal judicial procedure, by reconstructing a "typical" day in the
life of an escribano who worked in the lower criminal courts of Mexico City in
movement in
the decades before the outbreak ofthe tumultuous independence
1810.
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What can we possibly learn about the local criminal justice system by examining the work of such a low-level official ofthe court?2 Following an escribano on
his daily rounds, I would contend, ultimately provides a means to evaluate the
prevailing scholarly view of criminal judicial administration in Bourbon Mexico
and the nature of the late colonial state. Generations of historians, as well as
Liberal and Positivist critics, have asserted that the Bourbon
nineteenth-century
authorities in Mexico City and throughout the colony maintained a criminal
justice system that was corrupt, arbitrary, abusive, and unjust, and showed little
respect for due process of law. According to this perspective, the absolutist Bour?
bon state embraced oppressive criminal legal practices as one of the principal
means of controlling the popular groups, upholding public order, and ultimately
sustaining the state's authority through coercion and fear.3
view of the Bourbon state
By continuing to embrace this one-dimensional
and its elite allies, a view which obscures the multiple ways in which the state
was experienced
and understood, most scholars of colonial law and judicial
in Mexico City tenaciously cling to what historians of early
administration
modern Europe have shown to be a questionable model of an absolutist state.
In the last fifteen years, the literature on European state formation has offered a
more complex and nuanced understanding of royal absolutism that disputes the
notion that monarchs of the ancien regime exercised absolute and,
conventional
in some instances, despotic power. These studies illustrate that the concept and
historiography of 'absolutism' were largely products of both royal rhetoric and
Liberals who denounced the earlier regimes
the diatribes of nineteenth-century
as part of their ideological struggles against the post-Napoleonic
conservative
restoration monarchies. When stripped of its "mythology," the early modern
state that emerges from this recent literature is one that generally is not despotic,
arbitrary, or autocratic, even in the period of "Enlightened Despotism." In spite of
the rhetoric and imagery of'absolutism,' institutional prerogatives, customs, and
law, even criminal law, constrained state power, and the monarch was expected to
and largely did respect the rights of his subjects. This revisionist understanding
of the ancien regime, which is sensitive to the pre-modern balance between
absolute and limited authority, can prove helpful in rethinking the prevailing
notion of criminal judicial administration in Mexico City in particular and the
late colonial state in general.4
Another shortcoming of the dominant view of judicial and other state in?
stitutions in colonial Mexico City is that it primarily emphasizes government
objectives and policies, and the responses to these initiatives, while de voting
less attention to the institutional processes and means by which such intended
outcomes were generated, an approach that thereby ignores the crucial aspect
of how institutions work.5 The inner and intimate workings of public institu?
tions provide insight into issues of state power and legitimacy as well as popular
perceptions and responses. How institutions operate, not simply what they try
to accomplish, also shapes how they are viewed by individuals and groups of
all social classes. While historians know much about the structure of the ex?
panded municipal criminal justice system in Mexico City, which by the end
of the eighteenth century processed over 10,000 cases annually, little has been
written about how it functioned on a daily basis. This essay will emphasize that it
is not simply in the final court decisions, but also in the everyday and mundane
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operations of the courts, such as in the criminal procedural forms and methods
practiced by judicial officials, that working-class people in Mexico City formed
opinions about the fairness ofthe law, which in turn helped shape notions about
their relationship with the multi-faceted colonial state.6

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Mexico City, the largest
city in the Western Hemisphere at that time, experienced what Silvia Arrom
refers to as its "first 'urban crisis'" as mounting economic difficulties confronted
most residents of the capital.7 Life for the popular classes became more arduous and less secure in the closing decades of colonial era. The working poor,
a diverse group of Spanish, Indian, and casta (mixed ethnic background) arti?
sans and day laborers who comprised roughly three-quarters of Mexico City's
residents, suffered from a severe labor surplus, inflation, wage
125,000-160,000
stagnation, periodic subsistence crises, and an overall decline in living standards,
which were fueled by high annual urban growth rates and which
developments
resulted in, by all accounts, increased levels of crime. The viceregal authorities
responded to what they perceived as an unstable and dangerous situation by
expanding the police and local court system in the early 1780s and by relying
on military patrols to maintain "public tranquility."8 In language that expressed
their economic and cultural distance from members of urban popular groups,
government officials and the city's wealthier residents publicly described the
and
increasingly impoverished working poor of Mexico City in a contemptuous
anxious
manner.9
yet always
condescending,
of criminal justice
To what extent did such fears shape the administration
in the rapidly-growing metropolis? Did they ultimately lead to the arbitrary
and abusive legal behavior that historians have claimed was the norm in the
late colonial period? One profitable way to address these issues and assess the
detailed operation of the local criminal justice system is to examine the duties
of an escribano like Mariano Espinosa.10 The workhorses of the judiciary in
Mexico City, as a close reading of criminal records will illustrate, were those
escribanos who assisted one of the principal magistrates (jueces mayores) of the
eight first instance tribunals or one or more of the thirty-two alcaldes de barrio
Siete
or ward police officials. Spanish law dating back to the thirteenth-century
Partidas required scribes to be involved in every step ofthe judicial process, from
arrest through sentencing, since all actions and activities had to be witnessed
and recorded by the escribano in order to have legal validity.11 The magistrate
and the scribe, both of whom were charged with ensuring that all cases were
handled in accordance with the law and that legal guarantees were fulfilled,
acted as the primary figures in the criminal judicial process. While the judge
and
initiated the criminal proceedings, supervised the subsequent investigation,
his
to
the
he
issued major legal judgements,
investigation
typically delegated
the
criminal
to
assess
the
evidence
in
who
turn
necessary
escribano,
gathered
judicial process, the escribano, as the eyes,
charge.12 In the Ibero-American
ears, and feet of the court, was the most active and involved judicial official in
criminal proceedings.13 Not merely a court reporter, he served as the principal
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investigator for the judge as well as the judicial officer who implemented the
magistrate's decisions. In making certain that standard legal procedural norms
were followed, the escribano ultimately played a significant role in determining
the effectiveness and integrity ofthe criminal judicial system.14 In recognition
of their crucial role, Charles III noted in 1788 that "the fair administration of
justice ... (and) also the peace and tranquility ofthe communities ... depend in
on the dedication and impartiality ofthe Scribes."15 The escribano,
great part...
though often absent in historians' narratives, was both the representative and
embodiment ofthe legal culture inNew Spain, or at least in Mexico City, where
almost two-thirds of royal escribanos in the colony resided.16
The scribes' central role in legal cases required expertise in proper juridical
forms and processes. How they acquired such knowledge depended on whether
they were appointed as royal or as deputy scribes. Before receiving the title "es?
cribano real," royal scribes, most of whom were creoles (locally-born Spaniards),
studied published and manuscript legal
undertook a four-year apprenticeship,
handbooks and formularies, participated in workshops offered by Real CoUgio de
Escribanos after its establishment in 1792, and passed an examination administered by the Audiencia, the highest colonial court in New Spain.17 As a result of
their personal background, education, and accreditation, escribanos reales were
considered to be legal professionals, not mere clerks (i.e. escribientes).18
Though scribes were central to the legal process, these judicial officials were
in short supply in Mexico City and in the colony of New Spain as a whole at
the end of the colonial period.19 There simply were not enough royal scribes to
fill the forty positions prescribed by the expanded local criminal justice system
in Mexico City.20 The solution to this shortfall was twofold. In an explicit
recognition of this problem, viceregal authorities sanctioned in 1782, originally
as an interim measure, the appointment of escribanos habiUtados, so-called deputy
scribes who did not have to undergo the formal training and certification process
required of escribanos reales. Dozens of these deputized officials, who, like Mariano
creole in background, were deployed soon after
Espinosa, were overwhelmingly
the expanded judicial system became operational.21 Since this solution still did
not produce enough scribes to fully staff the courts and assist the police, the
viceroys appointed escribanos, both royal and deputy, to work in more than
one minor district.22 Some scribes served not only the magistrate of one of the
cuarteUs mayores, but also the four alcaldes de barrio who served in the precincts
of that district.23
As a result of the pivotal role that escribanos played in the Ibero-American
legal system, their presence in the expanded criminal justice system was mandatory, even if the viceregal authorities relied on deputy scribes to ensure compliance with legal norms and expectations.24 Although personal integrity and
intellectual capability were the only specified qualifications necessary to serve
as escribanos habiUtados, the men named to these positions tended to have some
legal experience prior to their appointment and had ready access to the same
legal handbooks and formularies that helped train the royal scribes.25 Further,
the escribanos habiUtados, like the escribanos reales, generally served for many
years, thereby acquiring substantial professional experience over time.26 In spite
of occasional protests from the Rector of the Real CoUgio de Escribanos over the
continued use ofthe deputy scribes, the local magistrates, including those jurists

JUSTICE

BY PAPERWORK

983

who served as judges on the Sala del Crimen, praised the quality of their work. As
cogent testimony to their more than acceptable performance, one of these high
court magistrates, Manuel del Campo y Rivas, informed the viceroy in 1809 that
he believed Mariano Uruena, the deputy scribe who assisted him and the four
akaldes de barrio in his district, had been trained at the Real Colegio de Escribanos
and had passed the exam supervised by the Audiencia.21
Because of their experience and background in procedural law as well as their
centrality in criminal proceedings, escribanos acted as legal advisors to the three
municipal lay magistrates and the thirty-two akaldes de barrio, judicial personnel
who had no prior legal training.28 On a daily and recurring basis, the escribanos
were a font of reliable knowledge about proper legal procedures from arrest to final
sentencing, information that was particularly critical given the vast, complex,
and sometimes contradictory nature of Spanish colonial law.29 Their advisory
function was especially valuable considering the high rate of turnover in law
enforcement and judicial positions and the demanding administrative duties of
all the magistrates and ward police.30 Scribes provided for legal continuity in the
courts ofthe municipal judges and in the neighborhood districts ofthe akaldes de
barrio?1 They ensured that in the daily administration of justice, lay magistrates
and other judicial figures correctly followed procedural forms at each step in
the criminal case. Particularly at the lower levels of the municipal criminal
justice system, the escribano's knowledge of the legal process was essential for a
and legally-constituted
judicial system.32
smooth-running
the daily operation
Given the importance of historicizing and contextuaiizing
ofthe criminal justice system, that is, to understand notions of law in a particular
place and time, it is imperative to discuss the work routine ofthe court scribes and
assess the administration of criminal justice on the basis ofthe extensive case file
evidence, not, as has often been the case, on the second-hand comments of late
the following account of the judicial system
colonial observers. Consequently,
and its officials is grounded largely on an analysis of almost 7,400 criminal cases
processed in the lower courts of the viceregal capital between the early 1780s
andl810.33
The average daily caseload for each scribe ranged from at least one to as many
as ten, or twelve, or in some instances, fifteen.34 The number of criminal cases
varied as a result of several factors. The viceroy could appoint escribanos to assist
from one to as many as five judicial officials.35 The caseload also depended on
the level of criminal activity and the resulting police work as well as the number
of criminal charges filed by residents of the city. Weekends and religious holi?
days placed greater demands on all local judicial officials, particularly because
of an extraordinary increase in the incidence of drink-related offenses. Finally,
the workload of the escribanos related to the manner in which the magistrates
handled the criminal cases. Depending on the gravity of the offense, the eight
lower courts of Mexico City adjudicated criminal cases through either a jukio
More than nine of every ten criminal cases were
sumario or ajuicio ordinario.
processed as juicios sumarios, that is, summary or abbreviated proceedings for
minor offenses in which the magistrates issued a sentence after preliminary tes?
timony had been given and, if necessary, additional fact-finding investigations
had been conducted.37 The more serious offenses, which necessitated more ex?
cases
tensive judicial activities, became the juicios ordinarios, time-consuming
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that involved a more prolonged investigative phase before the magistrate issued
a final sentence.38 With these variables in mind, we should remember that the
many cases comprising the escribano's daily work routine fell into different stages
ofthe criminal judicial process, from initial processing to judicial investigation,
and ultimately to final sentencing.
What becomes notable upon reading many juicios is the routine, almost formulaic nature of criminal proceedings. While the predictability of legal procedure
is observed again and again in the summary and more formal cases, I suggest
that we do not ascertain the intimate workings of the criminal justice system,
or its underlying principles, until we examine how it functioned in the course
of a "typical" day. A description of one or several cases does not illustrate the
daily workload and the professional commitment of an escribano. A better sense
of judicial administration emerges when individual cases are placed within the
larger context of an entire workday.39
The following composite picture of a representative day in the life of a scribe
in Bourbon Mexico City will focus on his standard work practices, not on the
anomalies that historians and penal critics have tended to portray as the juridical
norm.40 The day for an escribano customarily began between 7:00-8:00 in the
morning in one of the local jails where he reviewed the Libro de entradas (Book
of Admissions) for prisoners who had been arrested on the previous day by order
of his magistrate or by his alcalde de barrio.4'1 After he recorded the particulars for
each prisoner, such as the name, other biographical information, the arresting
officer, and the nature of the offense, he proceeded, as was required by law, to
take brief statements from each of the accused in the jail's sala de declaraciones
(statement room) in order to document the reasons for their imprisonment and
the circumstances behind the criminal charges.42 The escribano then returned
to his office where he noted this information in abbreviated form in an arrest
the Libro de reos, and prepared in writing a brief
inventory he maintained,
account (certificacion) of each of the new cases for the magistrate. Armed with
the inventory and the certificaciones, as well as any of the files of the juicios
ordinarios that were in need of court review, he then headed off to the office
or home of the judge to personally deliver and, if necessary, explain this latest
batch of judicial records.43
The judge began this meeting with his escribano by reviewing the new cases. If
the offense was minor and the preliminary testimonies substantiated or refuted
the charges, the magistrate, depending on the nature of the offense and the
evidence, either pronounced the sentence or authorized additional legal proce?
dures such as the submission ofa medical report on the victim (fe de heridas), the
preparation ofa character investigation (averiguacion de vida y costumbres), or the
recording of testimony from the aggrieved party, eyewitnesses, and/or police of?
ficials. If preliminary evidence underscored the gravity ofthe offense or, in cases
of aggravated assault, if the victim's life were in danger, the magistrate authorized
the commencement
ofa more formal juicio ordinario, an injunction that typically
outlined the nature of the subsequent investigation required of the scribe. For
the juicios sumarios, the escribano dutifully recorded the judge's decrees (autos)
in the arrest inventory. For the more formal juicios ordinarios, the scribe opened
a new criminal file by transcribing the order dictated by the judge (auto cabeza
del proceso) that initiated the sumaria, the first or probatory phase ofthe case. At
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this point, the magistrate turned his attention to the outstanding criminal files,
reading the most current testimonies and the results of other judicial actions
before issuing a sentence or ordering the escribano to undertake more inquiries
or perform some other appropriate court action. After recording this batch of
decrees in the files, the scribe gathered his documents and returned to his office
to plan and coordinate his court-ordered responsibilities
for the remainder of
the day.
The case evidence suggests that the next portion of the day began with our
escribano returning to the jail to notify the prisoners and the jailer, in writing
and orally, of the judge's sentences, pronouncements
that had to be signed or
certified by all parties in front ofthe scribe.44 Upon leaving the jail, the escribano
most likely turned his attention to the latest round of testimonies required by
the judge. Taking statements generally consumed considerable time, especially
since there was no one central location where these declarations were recorded.
While he could take additional testimony from a prisoner before leaving the
jail or find an assault victim in one of the hospitals, our escribano was forced
to scurry all over the sprawling city to track down and take statements from
most demanding of his time
eyewitnesses and police officials. Unquestionably,
were cases involving multiple prisoners and/or many witnesses.
Other standard judicial procedures performed by the scribe on any given day
might include: recording and collecting medical reports from royal physicians;
delivering criminal files to the asesor ktrado or the magistrate of another criminal
jurisdiction in the city; informing all parties involved in a case ofthe court's ma?
jor rulings; arranging and conducting a careo (a face-to-face encounter between
the accused and other parties and witnesses) in order to reconcile conflicting
the provisions of the judge's sentence, such as
testimony; and implementing
a
to
a
workshop to learn a trade or making necessary arrange?
young boy
sending
ments for placing a woman in a deposito or casa de honra (forms of supervisory
custody).
The escribano also had to find time during the day to manage his judicial
books and files. He had to maintain and update all criminal records, such as
the Libro de reos, the outstanding juicios ordinarios as well as a series of ledgers
(Libros de conocimientos) of these materials,45 and the Sala del Crimen required
him to prepare bi-weekly status reports of the formal criminal cases for which
he was responsible. In addition, he attended to the many details of managing
the individual case files, such as retrieving and filing any relevant materials,
archiving completed files, and appending documents submitted by physicians,
family members, and the prisoner. These daily routines could always be disrupted
at any time if a crime were reported to his akalde de barrio or juez mayor since,
as stipulated by law, any arrest made after an accusation had been filed had to
be properly recorded in the presence of an escribano.*6 Such disruptions were a
common occurrence since members of the popular classes of Mexico City filed
thousands of such criminal complaints annually.47
The early evening hours brought little respite from the day's activities. A num?
ber of tasks required attention, such as implementing unfinished judicial orders,
updating and delivering criminal files, and recording testimonies from witnesses
who had not been located earlier that day. Finally, the escribano accompanied his
judge or akalde de barrio on the evening neighborhood patrols (rondas), where in
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the course of recording any arrests and other judicial actions they occasionally
were exposed to iife-threatening
situations.48 These rondas generally began at
8:00 PM and sometimes were conducted on the hour until midnight or 1:00
AM.
While the above narrative describes a representative day for our archetypal
escribano, we must remember that he was expected to perform these responsi?
bilities for 14 to 18 hours daily, seven days a week, 365 days a year, with an
increased workload on weekends and holidays.49 Moreover, in addition to this
daily routine, he also discharged additional judicial responsibilities as the need
arose. In 1787, for instance, the Sala del Crimen required all escribanos with active
cases to participate in the weekly Saturday morning inspections of the city and
royal jails.50 In addition, the magistrate or akalde de barrio at times mandated
special judicial actions of their scribes such as furnishing drawings of weapons
and other evidence, summarizing complex and lengthy files, and accompanying
a police official to examine a corpse in the middle of the night.51 Particularly
were the procedural actions required during any of the peritime-consuming
odic Uvas de vagos (forced levies of alleged vagrants) or in implementing
the
occasional royal pardon.52
In addition to his regular and intermittent judicial responsibilities,
the es?
cribano also had to fulfill exacting administrative obligations, especially those
relating to municipal administration, or PoUcia, which spawned reams of paperwork. In a governmental system that did not separate administrative and judicial
functions, the magistrates and their alcaldes de barrio, in addition to their crimi?
nal law duties, were responsible for enforcing a myriad of edicts that attempted to
regulate garbage collection, street paving and lighting, liquor violations, build?
ing codes, and animal control.53 The escribanos of these officials recorded and
delivered the innumerable reports, some of them submitted weekly, that touched
on local administrative matters.54
Finally, on top of their criminal and administrative charges, some ofthe scribes
also possessed varying degrees of responsibilities in the preparation of civil lawsuits and notary records. Unlike the escribanos de cdmara, the institutionallybased scribes who assisted the ministers of the Sala del Crimen, the escribanos
of the municipal lay magistrates and the alcaldes de barrio maintained their own
offices which, depending on their level of involvement in litigation and notary
records, might be staffed with clerks and perhaps an apprentice.55
Even though the escribanos performed a remarkable amount of work on a
recurring basis, we should not conclude as a matter of course that their seemingly excessive duties compromised the speed or quality ofthe criminal judicial
process. Not seen in this daily snapshot is the expeditious nature of court ac?
tivities. In the juicios sumarios, three of four people arrested were sentenced on
the following day, with 90 percent of all the accused receiving their final court
decisions within three days after incarceration. Even in the more procedurally
involved juicios ordinarios, the average length of time from arrest to sentence was
slightly less than two months.56 Moreover, the case evidence strongly suggests
that the extensive responsibilities ofthe escribanos and the expeditious nature of
judicial process did not generally undermine their effort to "get at the facts" of
the case. Time and time again, as seen in thousands of cases, the scribes recorded
the testimonies the judges ordered and, on many occasions, decided on their
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own if additional statements or other judicial procedures, such as a careo, were
necessary to uncover and reconcile relevant information about the case.57

What might we learn about the criminal justice system in late Bourbon Mexico
City from this intimate study of one of its judicial officials? What is striking at
first giance is that the colonial legal system adhered to centuries-old standards
of Spanish judicial procedure, in spite of the heavy caseload that fell on the
shoulders ofthe understaffed courts and its overworked escribanos and in spite of
elite and government fears regarding the behavior of urban
publicly-expressed
popular groups. Central to criminal proceedings, even in the overextended lower
courts of rapidly-growing Mexico City, was the requirement that the accused
must be allowed to defend themselves and that the magistrates must substantiate
the charges before any punitive sentence could be imposed. Charles IV reiterated
this fundamental juridical principle in a 1796 royal decree outlining proper
criminal judicial procedure for cases involving resisting arrest: "I hereby declare
and order that the Courts, using those judicial proofs that are established by
the Law, henceforth shall not issue the sentences ... without beforehand legally
also order) that under no
proving the crime and (the guilt of) the criminals-(I
circumstances shall the testimony of the prisoner or the prisoners not be taken
and their exceptions and defenses not be heard since it is through such measures
that the Courts can proceed in their cases and render their decisions with careful
and prudent deliberation, without the danger of oppressing the innocent, which is
one ofthe commendabk objectives in the administration of justice."58 (Italics mine)
While Spanish colonial criminal law, like all penal codes, was designed to
protect and bolster existing power relations and social inequalities, it also pro?
vided for certain procedural safeguards for all subjects involved in criminal
proceedings.59 As seen in thousands of summary and formal criminal cases,
judicial procedure, in its various forms, was customarily followed in the lower
courts of Mexico City, despite the burgeoning caseload, staffing concerns, and
growing fear of crime and other forms of social disorder.
Legal safeguards were repeatedly honored in the daily administration of crim?
inal justice in late colonial Mexico City because ofa shared understanding that
state authority was based, in part, on the functioning of public institutions in
ways that had become culturally expected by all social groups. The expectations
of "justicia," which were frequently articulated in testimonies and criminal ac?
cusations of working-class people in Mexico City, were based on a widely-held
notion of fairness, that is, the belief that the king and his agents would adhere
to basic legal guarantees in a timely manner, and, as a result, would not treat
his subjects in arbitrary, abusive, and unpredictable ways.60 The extent to which
the criminal justice system routinely performed in culturally familiar ways in?
fluenced how popular groups assessed the fairness and hence the legitimacy of
judicial institutions.61 The daily operation ofthe criminal justice system, as em?
bodied in part in the procedural work ofthe escribano who regularly upheld legal
and cultural norms, shaped popular notions of the state and thereby became
one ofthe means through which public authority was sustained in late Bourbon
Mexico City.62
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While the everyday practices ofthe court, as partially seen in the work routine
of the scribe, tempered arbitrary justice and largely met popular expectations,
room for possible abuses and problems. Let me briefly
there was, nonetheless,
address the extent to which corruption and inefficiency might have undermined
the operation and hence credibility of criminal judicial institutions in Mexico
City. The traditional fee-based system of remuneration for scribes offered the
for
potential for extortion, but I contend that this method of compensation
judicial services did not create major problems for most working-class people
who came into contact with the criminal legal system. Careful reading ofthe case
evidence, against the backdrop of established and expected procedural norms,
does not suggest that charging excessive and unnecessary fees was a common
problem in the criminal proceedings of the city's lower courts.63 If financial
considerations solely or largely motivated the daily behavior of scribes and other
judicial officials, one would assume that, because of the additional fee-based
procedural actions required in the formal criminal cases, more juicios ordinarios,
and fewer summary cases, would have been authorized, but, as seen repeatedly
in the case files, the decision to handle a case as a sumario or an ordinario was
based on the gravity of the offense, not on the potential for generating fees for
the scribe and other court officials. Another possible financial abuse was that in
the juicios ordinarios, the judge, as advised by his escribano, could have mandated
more fee-based judicial actions. What typically occurred in the more formal
cases, however, was that the magistrate, if fully convinced ofthe culpability of
the accused, terminated the case upon completion of the investigative phase
(sumaria), thereby avoiding the redundant and often dispensable pUnario phase,
a more time-consuming
and expensive part of the trial in which the parties
offered a complex series of judicial proofs.64
There is little evidence to suggest that the scribes unnecessarily prolonged
their judicial activities in spite of a fee structure that in principle would have
financially rewarded such behavior. For instance, for conducting a careo, the
arancel (sanctioned fee list) authorized the escribanos to collect one peso from
each prisoner who participated in this judicial confrontation.65 Given the fact
that the magistrate typically gave his scribe discretion to call for this procedu?
ral action, the escribano could have easily abused his authority by authorizing
numerous careos, but the only time they appear in the records was when the
scribe wished to resolve major discrepancies in the testimonies before the judge
issued the final sentence. In all, the magistrates and escribanos typically did not
call for unnecessary judicial procedures to increase the total amount of fees the
scribe could collect. These judicial officials typically undertook the necessary,
but minimal steps in their handling ofthe criminal cases. Ultimately, we should
bear in mind that the judges, in accordance with royal legislation, often waived
the payment of scribe fees for indigents, a decision that not only lessened the
financial burdens of criminal justice on the poor, but also provided an incentive
to expedite the criminal proceedings.66
The potential for monetary abuses was far greater in the civil lawsuits processed in Mexico City. Not only did the parties embroiled in litigation generally
have more financial resources than those who became involved in the criminal
judiciary, the evidence also suggests that escribanos reales and lawyers in civil
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cases prolonged proceedings on many occasions if it were in the interests of
their clients, and themselves, to delay.67 While some criminal cases surely were
affected by financial abuses, they simply did not offer the potential for monetary gain that the civil cases did.68 The more lucrative civil law practices of the
scribes tended to make the daily operation of the criminal judicial system more
honest.69
Chronic delays in the handling of criminal cases might have compromised
the expectations of justice, but very few cases were excessively drawn out. Once
again, the case file evidence provides insight into the relatively few protracted
proceedings. In general, procedural delays were not the result of negligence and
on the part of court personnel, although in some instances an
mismanagement
overworked and understaffed bureaucracy misplaced criminal files, which did
of judicial actions and prolong incarceration.70
postpone the implementation
Delays were much more likely a result of other factors. A magistrate could have
he had all the
ordered additional procedural steps if he were not convinced
information necessary to issue an appropriate sentence; or the case involved
necessitated ad?
another criminal jurisdiction in the city, which consequently
ditional judicial actions; or the aggrieved parties dragged their feet in order to
keep the accused from leaving jail; or the court was waiting for an assault victim
to recover from injuries before passing sentence.71
This understanding and portrayal ofthe criminal justice system of late colonial
Mexico City does not seek to deny that law can be coercive and that power is
embedded in court procedures.72 Criminal law can and does impose rules and
punishments, and its power also can be expressed in the manner in which the
judicial process shapes experiences and meanings. The key is in how that power
is expressed, and as is seen through the daily activities ofthe escribano, the courts
did not withhold legal guarantees and ultimately issue arbitrary and unduly harsh
sentences.73
But why was this so, particularly at a time of rapid urban change, increasing
crime, and resulting elite and government concerns? Why did the escribanos of
late Bourbon Mexico City continue, day-in and day-out, to take testimonies
and resolve discrepancies, in even the most minor of offenses, and why did the
local magistrates continue to base their sentences on the evidence gathered
in these judicial investigations? What ensured routine adherence to judicial
procedure, and thereby minimized the possibility of politicizing criminal justice,
was the continued and systematic application ofthe medieval juridical doctrine
of arbitrio judicial.? This concept, best understood as judicial will or discretion,
sentence
simply meant that the magistrate could modify the legally-prescribed
in order to render a judgment that sought equidad (equity) and maximized the
common good. As noted in the legal codes, a just and proper sentence had to
be based on evidence, the circumstances of the crime, and the background of
the accused, information the escribano collected in the probatory phase of the
case. Before issuing sentence, the judge assessed such factors as criminal intent,
motive, severity and place of crime, as well as the economic and ethnic status
ofthe accused. The ultimate objective, as stipulated by law and practiced in the
courts of colonial Mexico City, was that a magistrate would pronounce a sentence
that was proportionate to the crime and therefore tailored to the particular case,
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even if it meant that his decree modified the penalties specified in the laws.
This judicial flexibility, as evidenced by the routine evoking of arbitrio judicial,
depended on the standard and uniform application of judicial procedure.
and nineteenth-century
Eighteenthpenal reformers and theorists as well
as many historians of crime and Ibero-American law have mistakenly regarded
arbitrio judicial as another example of an abusive and capricious absolutist state.75
The potential for abuses clearly existed, since the magistrates, in accordance with
their personal preferences and impulses, could have decided to issue sentences
without undertaking the necessary probatory measures. However, examination
of thousands of criminal records from late colonial Mexico City unearths little
evidence of such legal misconduct. Judicial process was followed, sentences were
moderate and proportionate to the offense, and the judges as a matter of course
released the accused if there was insufficient evidence. Understood in the context
of Ibero-American legal traditions, the concept of arbitrio judicial represented not
so much a corruption of justice, as is typically portrayed in the literature, but
rather an opportunity to shape the law to reflect, or at least strike some balance
between, popular and elite expectations.76
The practice of arbitrio judicial had political repercussions that have not been
addressed in the historical literature, but are relevant to the issues raised in this
essay. The principle of judicial discretion, with origins in medieval Natural Law,
enabled both the superior and the inferior magistrates in Mexico City to main?
tain some distance from the wishes and intent of the colonial Bourbon state.
While judges and other judicial officials were, indeed, representatives ofthe gov?
ernment, they often acted independently ofthe state.77 The legally-constituted
authority to modify existing laws to fit the circumstances of the crime and to
issue sentences that reflected what they believed were just and proper afforded
a degree of autonomy to magistrates. Although such autonomy cushioned the
full impact of state power, the Bourbons, even when they repeatedly called for
adherence to sentences specified in the laws, ultimately did not tamper with
the relative independence
of the judges. Moreover, the growing fears of urban
disorder, combined with an overextended and understaffed local court system,
could have enticed the magistrates to neglect extensive judicial investigations
and simply issue arbitrary and harsh sentences, but, as we have seen, they did
not. This judicial and political behavior, both in the criminal courts as well as in
the offices of the Bourbon policy makers, reflects the respect for and adherence
to a deeply-entrenched
legal culture in late colonial Mexico City.
To fully comprehend the nature ofthe criminal justice system in Mexico City
is to understand that the judicial power ofthe colonial state and its agents was not
to be found in the trappings, rituals, and royal regalia ofthe court/8 As seen in
the daily activities of an escribano, there were no courtroom trials in the IberoAmerican legal tradition, a judicial style that, unlike its eighteenth-century
English counterpart, was not publicly magisterial. The so-called criminal "trial"
in the Spanish colonial legal system was more ofa dispersed, bureaucratic inves?
tigation, which culminated in a final judicial ruling. There were no formal court
hearings in late colonial Mexico City, but the escribano recorded testimony and
performed other judicial actions, ultimately delivering a complete investigative
report or dossier to the magistrate to read before he issued the final sentence.79
The judge rarely saw the accused, not even to pronounce the sentence and issue
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the usual admonition, but he did meet with his escribano every day to ensure
that the proper and expected legal actions were being undertaken.80
It was justice by paperwork, with the escribano, as an intermediary between
state and society, involved in every step.81 In fulfilling his procedural responsi?
bilities, the scribe functioned as one of the many lesser royal officials through
assured.82
whom Spanish power was expressed and its authority conditionally
By generally adhering to cultural expectations ofthe law, as expressed in routine
and quotidian court procedures and outcomes, the principal court officials, the
magistrate and the escribano, helped to foster and sustain legitimacy for judicial
institutions in late colonial Mexico City.83

Let us now return to Mariano Espinosa's petitions and briefly re-examine
of the
them within a broader understanding of the customary responsibilities
escribanos. The evidence suggests that Espinosa was not exaggerating his claims
and that he was, indeed, an overworked official in an understaffed judiciary. The
meager income he earned for the demanding and sometimes dangerous criminal
judicial work motivated Espinosa to seek salaried employment in the viceregal
bureaucracy, which he finally secured by 1806 when we find him in a low-level
legal position in the Sala del Crimen.8*
As seen in the criminal procedures performed day after day by Espinosa and
other escribanos, late colonial royal and municipal officials, in an era of expanding
of public
urban poverty, growing fear of crime and a concomitant enhancement
an
or
in
exercise
did
not
capricious
arbitrary
judicial power
security measures,
manner.85 Such legal behavior fostered, I would suggest, a widespread acceptance
ofthe legitimacy of criminal judicial institutions in Mexico City, an acceptance
based in part on the court's adherence to expectations of procedural fairness and
as evidenced by the thousands of poor people from diverse backgrounds who
voluntarily went to the courts each year as a means of seeking "justicia," righting
wrongs, and pursuing various strategic objectives.86 This is not to say that force
was absent in the criminal justice system, but coercion is best understood as
part of a wider array of other, less harsh methods of securing social cooperation.
Contrary to what others have claimed about the colonial system of criminal
justice, the Bourbons did not rule in Mexico City largely through fear.87
While this essay does not address other regions of New Spain or earlier pe?
riods in Mexico City, the procedural case evidence suggests that fundamental
juridical elements of the medieval and early modern Hapsburg states endured
in Mexico City toward the end of Bourbon rule.88 Late colonial royal policy
makers unquestionably
attempted to rationalize and centralize government in?
not challenge traditional, pre-Enlightenment
did
but
juridical
stitutions,
they
principles, principles that, as the literature on European state formation also has
demonstrated, checked unbridled royal power and worked to limit the authority
of the "absolutist" Bourbon state.
By continuing to provide a predictable, flexible, and procedurally fair legal
order, the Bourbons understood the role that law plays in sustaining author?
ity. Like their Hapsburg predecessors, they clearly associated notions of good
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government and the maintenance of political order with proper administration
of justice.89 In fact, beginning in the 1750s and continuing for the next four
decades, Bourbon authorities on both sides ofthe Atlantic implemented a series
of measures to improve the quality of justice, especially in procedural matters,
measures that upheld and reinforced traditional Iberian juridical principles, such
as arbitrio judicial.90 The Bourbons most certainly sought public order in an era
characterized by change and anxiety, yet, when we explore the innermost workings of criminal judicial institutions in Mexico City, it becomes clear that they
did not seek order at any price.91
Department of History
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(Mexico City, 1764), and the two volume work by Joseph Juan y Colon, Instruccion de
Escribanos en Orden a k Judicial (Madrid, 1787), the second volume of which focused on
"juridical instructions" to scribes, lawyers, and magistrates of the lower courts. Susana
Garcfa Le6n, ed., "Un formulario de causas criminales de la Nueva Espana," Anuario
Mexkano de Historia del Derecho 9 (1997): 83-148; Charles R. Cutter, ed., Libro de ks
principaks rudimentos (Mexico City, 1994).
26. Espinosa, for instance, ultimately worked as a scribe in Mexico City for over three
decades (1788-1820). Among the many escribanos who served local judicial officials
for extended periods of time are Rafael Cartami (1787-1828), Mariano Uruena (18031820), and Rafael Castro (1797-1814). AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 7; AGN, Civil,
vol. 2156, exps. 3 and 4; Linda Arnold, Directorio de burocratas en k ciudad de Mexico,
1761-1832 (Mexico City, 1980), 39, 63, 89, 277-278.
2 7. The magistrate offered these positive assessments as part of an 1809 investigation into
the alleged abuses in the appointment of escribanos habuitados. The inquiry commenced
when the senior local magistrate, Francisco Arcipreste, contended that an unspecified
number ofthe deputy scribes did not have what he deemed to be proper titles of appoint?
ment. He expressed concern that some of these escribanos might have exercised their
duties even though they were never issued formal printed titles of their appointment,
that sometimes more than one had been appointed to serve in the same district, and fi?
nally that some also may have continued to serve after their term had expired. Arcipreste
persuaded Viceroy Francisco Javier de Lizana y Beaumont that it was time to investigate
and remedy these alleged abuses as well as explore the possibility of using only formally
trained escribanos reaks in all the minor districts of the capital. The Viceroy ordered the
jueces mayores to review the status, appointments, and, additionally, the personal and
professional conduct of the deputy scribes. The resulting investigations uncovered only
one improper title of appointment, and they did not expose any inappropriate or unsatisfactory conduct of the escribanos habilitados. All but one of the magistrates, the senior
lay city magistrate who lodged the complaint, praised the quality of their work in spite
of their many duties and overall workload. Although Arcipreste presented no proof of
unsatisfactory professional conduct on the part of any deputy scribe in his jurisdiction,
which he surely would have done if it had been existed, he nonetheless conjectured that
scribes trained in the Real Cokgio de Escribanos would have performed better. It is impor?
tant to note that the sole dissenting judge was not a ktrado while those magistrates who
uniformly and enthusiastically commended their deputy scribes, the akaldes del crimen,
were professionally-trained jurists.
In an effort to protect and promote the prerogatives of their institution and its per?
sonnel, the board members of the Real Colegio de Escribanos nonetheless asked Viceroy
Lizana to annul the appointments of the deputy scribes, most of whom, they asserted,
were of questionable quality and character, and appoint instead escribanos reaks who had
been educated at the Cokgio and examined by the Audiencia. However, the governing
board, like akalde Arcipreste, was not able to specify abuses on the part of any specific
escribano habilitado, either presently or since they were initially used in the early 1780s.
The board members resorted to generalities and character assassination of the deputy
scribes, claiming at one point that half of them, as a result of their "vices and bad con?
duct," "had prostituted themselves." The general tenor of the board's comments reflected
frustration that viceregal and local officials did not adhere to the standard procedure for
the appointment of royal scribes and relied instead on a clause in the 1782 Ordinance that
allowed the viceroy to by-pass the Cokgio and the Audiencia and deputized individuals
who had been recommended by the city's magistrates. AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exps. 3
and 4.

998

journal of social history

summer 2003

28. The three municipal-level magistrates, the two alcaldes ordinarios and the corregjidor, did not possess any formal legal education and therefore, as required by law, were
assisted by a legal advisor (asesor letrado), a lawyer or jurist who reviewed and approved
all court sentences and other major judicial oraers issued by the lay judges. See, for in?
stance, Archivo Judicial del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal, Mexico
City (hereafter AJT), Penal, vol. 6, exp. 47; Borah, Justice by Insurance, 96-97. The
unremunerated position of alcalde de barrio was filled with private citizens, mainly petty
proprietors, the magistrates nominated and the viceroy appointed because of their local
standing and reputation, not because of any professional expertise. In accordance with
Spanish political philosophy and legal texts, appointment or election to judicial posts
depended more on character, integrity, and judgement than on command of juridical
knowledge. See Partida 3, titulo IV, ley 3 of the Siete Partidas; Ricardo Zorraquin Becu,
La funcion de justicia en el derecho indiano (Buenos Aires, 1948), 31-33. See note 33 for
comments about citing materials in the AJT
29. For instance, the alcaldes de barrios, who, as jueces originarios, had the limited au?
thority to instigate criminal proceedings before turning the case over to their juez mayor
for final sentencing, did not enjoy the services of an asesor Utrado and therefore had to
rely extensively on their scribe's knowledge of the penal process. For an example, see
AJT, Penal, vol. 9, exp. 5. Through their advice to the lay magistrates and the alcaldes de
barrioon points of substantive and procedural law, the escribanos made colonial law more
understandable and made certain that the judicial officials adhered to procedural norms
and processes.
30. The akaldes de barrioand the alcaldes ordinariostypically served for a two-year period.
Periodically, moreover, the senior alcalde ordinariojointly held the position of corregjdor,
which meant that he was the juez mayor of the tribunals of the sixth and seventh major
districts as well as the magistrate of the very active Tribunal del Alurnbrado, the court
of the street lighting guards. AGN, Ayuntamientos, vol. 177, exp. 9. Also see Lozano
Armendares, La criminalidaden la ciudad de Mexico, 19.
31. The viceroy appointed the escribanosfor a period of two years, although they generally
were re-appointed if they had performed satisfactorily. See AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp.
32. The legal expertise of escribanos who worked for one of the five alcaldes del crimen,
all of whom were highly-educated jurists, was obviously not as critical as it was for
the three lay magistrates and the alcaldes de barrio. For the advisory role that scribes
performed in early colonial Mexico City and elsewhere in Spanish colonial America, see
Mijares Ramirez, Escribanos y escrituraspublicas en el sigjoXVI, 46; Jorge Lujan Mufioz, Los
escribanos en las Indias OcciaentaUs, y en particular en el Reino de Guatemala (Guatemala,
1977), 71-72; Tamar Herzog, MeaHacion,archivos y ejercicio: Los escribanos de Quito (siglo
XVII) (Frankfurt am Main, 1996), 29-32.
33. In descending order of occurrence, the most frequent criminal charges involved
drink-related offenses, common-law marriage/adultery, theft, sexual misconduct, assault,
and illegal gambling. More than nine of ten arrests involved members of the working
poor and involved a cross-section of this group in terms of ethnicity, although Indians
(38%), males (74%), and artisans (50%) were over-represented in the court cases. We
should not disregard the fact that women and lower-class creoles respectively comprised
26% and 41% ofthe arrests. Michael C. Scardaville, "Crime and the Urban Poor: Mexico
City in the Late Colonial Period" (Ph.D. diss. Gainesville, 1977), 34-47.
Ofthe criminal cases analyzed, 7,067 came from ten extant arrest and court inventories
(Libros de reos) formerly located in two municipal judicial archives in Mexico City, the
Archivo Judicial del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Distrito Federal and the Archivo
General del Juzgado, Mexico City (hereafter AGJ). Since I first consulted the documents
in the AGJ, however, the historical records were misplaced during a renovation of the
building. The pre-1950 documents of the AJT were recently moved to the Mexican
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national archives, the Archivo General de la Nacion, but are still being catalogued.
Since these materials have not yet been completely indexed, I continue to cite them
in accordance with their former provenance. The remaining 296 cases analyzed for this
essay consisted of full-length, formal criminal cases (causas criminaks) located in the
collection of the Archivo Judicial del Tribunal Superior and in the Ramo Criminal in the
Archivo General de la Naci6n. For an excellent discussion ofthe Libros de reos, including
comments on the missing police and court inventories of the AGJ, see Sanchez-Arcilla,
"La Administraci6n de Justicia inferipr en la Ciudad de Me*xico," 316-332.
Many historians and nineteenth-century critics of Spanish colonial justice have based
much of their censure ofthe criminal justice system in Mexico City, particularly its alleged
abusive, arbitrary,and corrupt nature, on the commentaries ofthe late eighteenth-century
observer, Hipolito Villarroel, not on a comprehensive and systematic examination of
the case files. Moreover, a careful reading of Villaroel's criticism of the judicial system
illustrates that his charges are levied primarily at the operation of the civii, not criminal,
court procedure and that his denunciation ofthe escribanos has little basis in the case file
evidence. Mexico por dentro y fuera bajo el gobierno de ks vireyes, o sea enfermedadespolitkas
que padece k capital de esta Nueva Espana en casi todo ks cuerposde que se compone y remedios
que se k deben apUcarpara su curacidn si se quiere que sea Ml dreyyd pubUco(Mexico City,
1831), 36-40, 46-50. For a discussion of how his accusations shaped later perceptions
of criminal justice in the Bourbon colonial Mexico City, see Buffington, Criminal and
Citizen in Modern Mexico, 15-17, 21, 25. Woodrow Borah's brief biographical study of
Villarroel suggests that his indictment of the colonial legal system should be used with
considerable caution. "Alguna luz sobre el autor de las EnfermedadespoUucas,n EstuaHosde
Historia Novohispana 8 (1985): 51-79.
34. I estimated the average caseload by examining the daily arrest patterns in the Libros
de reos, particularly those maintained by the escribanos ofthe akalde ordinariosand akaldes
de barrionos. 21,22 and 23. AGJ, Librosde reos, akalde ordinariomas antiguo, 1800; Libros
de reos, akalde de barrio numero 21, 1800; Libros de reos, akalde ordinario menos antiguo,
1807; AJT, Librosde reos, akalde ordinariomas antiguo, 1795; Librosde reos, akalde ordinario
mas antiguo, 1796; Librosde reos, akalde ordinariomas antiguo, 1798; Ubros de reos, akaldes
de barrio numeros 22 y 23, 1798. The 1810 report of cases dispatched by the magistrates
and scribes of the Sata del Crimen reflects similar patterns. AGN, Real Acuerdo, vol. 20,
exp. 150, f. 28.
35. Our petitioner Mariano Espinosa, for instance, worked with one of the jueces mayores
as well as the four ofthe akaldes de barrio in his jurisdiction. AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exps.
3 and 4.
36. Juicios ordinarios, also referred to as procesos ordinarios, constitute the more formal
and extensive criminal cases (causas criminaks) the scribe ultimately archived upon their
completion. The libros de reos comprise an inventory ofthe juicios sumarios or, as they are
sometimes called, juicios or procesos verbaks. Based on Roman and canon law precedents,
medieval and subsequent Spanish law authorized juicios sumarios in order to minimize
expenses and expedite the judicial process, particularly for those minor offenses in which
the accused confessed or the evidence was more than sufficient for the judge to issue a
sentence. See the sections in the mid-eighteenth formuiaries on "De proceso criminal abrevktdo" in Garcfa Leon, "Un formulario de causas criminales," 146 and uProceso Criminal
abrebiado (sic)" in Cutter, libro de ks principaks rudimentos, 57; Francisco Tomas y Va?
liente, Gobierno e instituciones en k Espana del Antiguo Regimen (Madrid, 1982), 240-244;
Montero Aroca, La herenciaprocesal espanok, 65-79; Rodriguez de San Miguel, Pandectas
Hispano-Megicanas, 1: no. 1789; Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 139-140 and 144-147.
For the extensive use of summary or abridged hearings in the Juzgado General de Indios and
other Spanish American colonies, see, respectively, Borah, Justice by Insurance, 13-15
and Corvalan and Castillo, Derecho Procesal Indiano, 193-194. Handling criminal cases
in a summary fashion was also a common practice in English and American courts in
the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Peter King, Crime, Justice,
and Discretion in Entfand, 1740-1820 (Oxford, 2000); Clive Emsley, Crime and Society
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in England, 1750-1900, 2nd ed. (London, 1996), 12; Bradley Chapin, Criminal Justice in
Colonial America, 1606-1660 (Athens, 1983), 28-30.
37. Contrary to what nineteenth-century penal critics and most historians of the colo?
nial Mexican judicial system have claimed, summary, that is, abridged, trials did not
mean arbitrary justice and an abuse of legal guarantees. The magistrates followed stan?
dard criminal procedures in the juicios sumarios, and they did not presume the guilt of
the accused. As repeatedly seen in the case files, the preliminary testimony gathered by
the scribe generally determined the culpability of the defendants as well as the seriousness of the offense. The general pattern was that the judge released the accused in the
absence of corroborating evidence, or issued his sentence if there was proof of a minor
transgression. If the scribe's initial judicial inquiry indicated a more serious offense, the
judge then formed a sumaria, which initiated a more formal criminal investigation called
ajukio ordinario.
38. For excellent discussions of the more formal criminal judicial procedure used in
juicios ordinarios, see Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 105-146, Lozano
Armendares, La criminaUdaden la ciudad de Mexico, 165-167, and Montero Aroca, La
herencia procesal espanola, 29-63.
39. I do not wish to categorize the Ibero-American judicial process as being inherently
rigid and inflexible. While standard and formulaic to a certain degree, it also exhibited
a legally authorized flexibility. Law codes and royal legislation afforded magistrates the
right to abridge the criminal investigation if the accused confessed and, as I later discuss,
modify the sentence to fit the circumstances of the case. See Cutter, The Legal Culture of
Northern New Spain, 130-148; Corvalan and Castillo, Derecho Procesal lndiano, 193-194
and 213-214.
40. The general patterns I will describe reflect the work routine of all the escribanos,
although some of the specific quotidian responsibilities depended on the officials they
served and on the type of viceregal appointment, i.e. royal or habiUtado. For instance,
the five salaried scribes who assisted the magistrates of the Sala del Crimen, such as
the receptores and relatores, performed institutional duties for the high criminal court in
addition to the ones described in the essay. Moreover, it is not possible in the scope of this
article to discuss all the possible judicial activities undertaken by the different types of
escribanosor the many dimensions ofthe criminal judicial proceedings, such as the nature
of court sentences. These and other issues will be addressed in my forthcoming monograph
on the administration of criminal justice in Mexico City from the mid-eighteenth century
to the 1830s.
41. Prisoners tried in the courts of the five jueces mayores of the Sala del Crimen were
confined in the royal jail. Prisoners in the city jail fell under the jurisdiction of the two
alcaldes ordinarios and the corregidor.Escribanos de la cdrcel, one at each jail, maintained
the Libro de entradas. AGN, Bandos, vol. 3, exp. 28; AGN, Criminal, vol. 116, exp. 2;
AJT, Penal, vol. 8, exp. 62.
42. See AGN, Criminal, vol. 715, exp. 11, f. 246 for information concerning the sala
de declaraciones. Concerning the expeditious way in which testimony should be taken,
Charles III issued the following instruction to corregidoresin 1788: "that within twentyfour hours after imprisonment, any prisoner, without exception, shall give his statement
since it is not just to deprive a free man of his liberty without promptly knowing the
reason why it was taken away from him." Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas HispanoMegicanas, 3: no. 5138. Case evidence shows that the escribanos routinely recorded the
initial statement within one day after the arrest.
43. This daily routine was slightly altered every Thursday and Saturday morning when, in
preparation for the weekly visits to the royal and city jails, all scribes personally delivered
status reports ofthe active juicios ordinariosto the oidores, the highest-ranking magistrates
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ofthe Audiencia, or to the akaldes ordinarios. Eusebio Ventura Belena, Recopilacion sumaria
de todos ks autos acordados de k Real Audiencia y Sak del Crimen de esta Nueva Espana. 2
vols. (Mexico City, 1991), 2: no. 9, art. 9, 44-45.
44. In the interest of expediting justice, the law required scribes to notify the prisoner
of the sentence no later than one day after the judge pronounced it. Rodriguez de San
Miguel, Pandectas HispanO'Megicanas, 1: no. 1997. According to the case evidence, this
was routinely done on same day. For the role of escribanos in the sentencing process, see
Ibid. no. 1701.
45.

For a listing of these records, see AJT, Penal, vol. 13, exps. 1-4.

46.

See, AJT, Penal, vol. 4, exp. 9 and vol. 10, exp. 5.

47. The majority of arrests in the eight district tribunals occurred after someone, typically
a working-class person, filed a charge with an akalde de barrio or a magistrate. In 1798,
for instance, this meant that Indians, castas, and poor creoles filed over 3,000 criminal
charges in the lower courts of Mexico City. Arrests based on complaints were higher
in certain offenses, especially family-related problems, vagrancy, theft, and commonlaw marriage/adultery. Scardaville, "Crime and the Urban Poor," 10-11 and 35. The
expansion in the number of courts and judicial officials in the early 1780s as well as the
low cost of summary justice facilitated access to and use of the criminal justice system by
the urban poor, regardless of their economic situation and ethnicity. The reduction and
even elimination of court fees for indigents gave people from all social groups access to
the criminal judicial system. Civil litigation involved significantly greater costs than did
criminal cases. See notes 62 and 67 for additional comments on criminal and civil court
expenses.
48. AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 5 involves a case of a man brandishing a sword at
the scribe and other judicial officials who were attempting to arrest him.
49. Clearly, this portrait of a typical day represents an ideal scenario. It does not include
those days when the escribanowas ill or distracted by family or other matters. Nor should we
assume that all scribes were always and equally diligent in fulfilling their responsibilities.
However, the case file evidence involving dozens of escribanos over almost a thirty-year
period consistently reflects a high degree of professional commitment and performance.
50. AGN, Criminal, vol. 73, exp. 5, fs. 303-303v. The oidores or akaldes ordinarios
reviewed the status of each major criminal file (juicio ordinario) in the presence of the
prisoner and the scribe who handled the case to determine whether it snould continue
or, because of delays, be expedited or terminated.
51. See, for instance, AJT, Penal, vol. 3, exp. 9 and exp. 51; vol. 8, exp. 49; Archivo
Historico del Distrito Federal, Mexico City (hereafter AHDF), Policia en General, vol.
3628, exp. 72.
52. See, AJT, Penal, vol. 8, exp. 32. In addition to his routine duties, Mariano Espinosa
served as the scribe in the 326 cases generated during the kvas de vagos conducted in
1797 and 1798. AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 7.
53. Pre-constitutional Ibero-american governments, which were shaped largely by me?
dieval political principles, were not characterized by a separation of executive, legislative,
and judicial powers. As representatives of the king, who embodied all four dimensions of
governance, royal officials in varying degrees exercised multiple responsibilities. Judges
and police officials performed at a minimum judicial (justicia) and administrative (gobierno
or policia) duties. Some officials, like the corregidores,also discharged fiscal (hacienda) and
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military (guerra) obligations. For a succinct discussion ofthe relationship between justicia
and other govemmental functions, see Zorraqufn Becu, Lafuncionde justicia, 17-22 and
26-30.
54. For an overview of these activities relating to PoUcia, see AHDF, Alumbrado, vol.
345, exp. 8; AHDF, Policfa en General, vols. 3628 and 3629.
55. The royal scribes who assisted the lay magistrates also were known as escribanos de
numero or escribanos publicos and exercised a monopoly on all notarial duties in the city.
In addition to their work in civil suits, these escribanos publkos prepared, maintained,
and archived the specific legal instruments and the Ubros de protocolos that comprise
today's notary archives in Mexico City. Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas HispanoMegicanas, 2: no. 3610; Fernandez del Castiilo, Historia de la escribania, 55-56; Mijares
Ramfrez, Escribanos y escrituraspubUcasen el sigfo XVI, 45-47; 56-57; Icaza Dufour, "De
los escribanos publicos en Nueva Espana," 53, 88-89, 94. See note 21 concerning the
exclusion of deputy scribes from notarial duties and civil litigation.
56. Spanish law specified limits on the length of time required for certain judicial pro?
cedures. One such law in the 1462 Ordenamiento de Alcald, for instance, decreed that
magistrates must issue the final sentence no longer than twenty days after the investi?
gation had been completed. Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, 3:
no. 4108. The case evidence shows that this was routinely done, often long before the
three-week limit.
57. The typical escribano was not simply trying to get through the day as quickly as
possible. After reading many criminal cases, my sense is that the testimonies of witnesses
and the accused were relatively unstructured affairs in which their length and detail
varied in accordance with what person needed or wanted to express. Moreover, the scribe's
charge in the judge's auto cabeza del proceso gave him latitude to decide whether additional
actions, such as conducting a careo or locating additional witnesses, were necessary to
resolve any discrepancies in the evidence. Seen in this light, the principal investigative
charge of the escribanos was to provide, if possible, a file of congruent testimony and
other evidence to the judge so that he could make an informed deliberation. Again, my
impression, based on the case evidence, is that the scribes did not compromise the judicial
actions required of them.
58. Rodrfguez de San Miguel, Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, 3: no. 5139. This order
should not be read as evidence of widespread judicial abuse in Mexico City. Typically the
origin of such royal decrees is found in complaints that had been submitted by colonial
officials or subjects from any part of the empire, but the characteristic response of the
Spanish monarchy was to issue injunctions that were applicable throughout the colonies.
In this sense, this particular royal decree provided the king an opportunity to reaffirm
standard and expected judicial practices.
59. In spite of the legally-sanctioned social inequalities of the era which customarily
shaped the sentences of the court, the case evidence also shows that the courts systematically extended procedural safeguards to all of the accused, regardless of their class,
ethnicity, gender, and age.
60. Many petitions submitted to the magistrates end with the phrase: "es Justicia" an
assertion suggesting that members of popular groups expected that the legal system would
be procedurally fair and that justice would be served. Although such court documents
were drawn up with the assistance ofa scribe to ensure that they followed certain juridical
forms, they are nonetheless one reflection of the extent to which working class people
from different backgrounds possessed legal knowledge and expressed legal expectations.
As the literature on procedural fairness illustrates, notions of justice are based just as
much on receiving a fair hearing than on obtaining a desired court ruling. See note 6 for
an elaboration of this point.
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While historians typically have explained the application of due process as a royal favor
or as an act of royal benevolence, recent research points to the existence of a concept
of rights, including the notion of due process, that has roots in twelfth-century canon
law developments in Western Europe. These studies demonstrate the emergence of a
juridical-political consensus that all members of society possessed inalienable, individ?
ual God-given rights, not merely communal or corporate rights. A theory of individual
rights, which encompassed the principle of a defendant's legal rights, had become widely
accepted in Western jurisprudence by the end ofthe thirteenth century and subsequently
was incorporated into Spain's influential legal code, the Siete Partidas. The development
of a natural rights discourse that preceded the rise of early capitalism and the Enlight?
enment offers additional insight into why the courts of Bourbon Mexico City, even in
the absence of specific constitutional requirements, strictly adhered to procedural norms
for individuals from even the lowest, and the most feared, social classes. According to
medieval jurists and restated time and again in more secularized forms in succeeding
centuries, the king and his agents could not withhold such rights since they were bound
by a higher, natural law. Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural
Rights, NaturalLawandChurchLaw, 1150-1625 (Atianta, 1997); Annabel S. Brett, Dberty, Right, and Nature: Individual Rights in Later Schokstic Thought (Cambridge, 1997);
Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: Sovereignty and Rights in the
Western Legal Tradition(Berkeley, 1993); Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 81-97; Jorge M.
Ayala, "Antecedentes medievales de los derechos humanos," Veritas: Revista de Fiksofk
44 (1999): 853-864; Mackay, The Umits of Royal Authority, 173-177.
61. For a discussion of how legal protections contribute to regime legitimization, see Lind
and Tyier, The Social Psychokgy ofProceduralJustice;Jacob, "Introduction," in Courts, Law,
and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 13-14.
62. Other court practices reflective of the late colonial legal culture also contributed
to notions of fairness and effectiveness, such as speed of justice, cost, and final court
sentences. The judges waived certain kinds of judicial expenses for indigents and, as
previously noted, handled the vast majority of cases expeditiously. The magistrates' sen?
tences in juicios sumarios generally were temperate, with the courts acquitting or placing
on probation nearly one-quarter of all of the accused. Fines, which accounted for 29 per?
cent of the sentences in summary cases, were the most frequently used judicial penalty.
Ofthe thousands of cases analyzed, there were no incidences of capital punishment, and
corporal punishment was rarely used by the first decade of the nineteenth century. For
extended discussions ofthe generally moderate court sentences in both the juicios ordinar?
ios and juicios sumarios, see Scardaville, "Crime and the Urban Poor," 276-308; Lozano
Armendares, La criminalidaden k ciudad de Mexico, 169-180; and Sanchez-Arcilla, "La
Administracidn de Justicia inferior en la Ciudad de Mexico," 357 and 447-448.
63. For the authorized escribano fee structure (arancel) in criminal cases, see AGN,
Bandos, vol. 3 exp. 27.
64. Ibero-American law authorized this abbreviation of the formal judicial process. As
specified in the Skte Partidas, the pknario was necessary only if the sumaria or probatory
phase did not conclusively demonstrate the culpability ofthe accused or, in complex cases,
fully document the nature of the criminal offense. Montero Aroca, La herencia procesal
espafiok, 39; Corvalah and Castillo, Derecho Procesal Indiano, 213-214. Moreover, case
file evidence demonstrates that the municipal judges customarily terminated the process
upon the completion of the investigative phase if charges against the accused were not
substantiated. In Mexico City, iewjuicio ordinarioswent the full procedural distance.
65. AGN, Bandos, vol. 3, exp. 27.
66. Recopikcion de kyes de ks reynos de las Indias, Libro II, titulo 23, leyes, 48 and 52.
For the purpose of fee waivers, Spanish law defined indigence as not possessing any
property, a condition many working-class people were able to satisfy. Rodriguez de San

1004

journal of social history

summer 2003

Miguel, Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, 1: no. 2009. Also see, Ibid., 3: no. 4189; Lozano
Armendares, La criminaUdaden la ciudad de Mexico, 168-169.
As discussed in note 33, VillarroePs late eighteenth-century criticism of extortion
generally related to civil, not criminal, cases. Also see Rodriguez de San Miguel's comment
that scrifees in post-independence Mexico City, in spite of sixteenth-century legislation to
the contrary, tended to postpone taking action in civil suits involving poor people in favor
of those filed by wealthier litigants who could more easily afford the necessary judicial fees
and unsanctioned gratuities. Pandectas Hispano-Megicanas, I, no. 1685. Richard L. Kagan's
study of the civil law process in Hapsburg Spain presents an excellent discussion of the
widespread corruption and excessive delays that characterized the handling of lawsuits in
the Castilian judicial system. Lawsuits and Litigants in CastiU, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill,
1981), 37-51.
67.

68. In one 1804 case, the Sala del Crimen removed scribe Francisco Santaella from office
after the court substantiated an accusation that he took a gratificacion (unauthorized fee)
in an case involving common-law marriage. The Ministers of the high criminal court
rejected his petition to be reinstated. In this particular instance, the couple involved
possessed the financial means to offer a substantial bribe. AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 5.
The alcaldes del crimen removed scribes from office on other occasions after investigations
corroborated the charges of "abuses" or "excesses." While some escribanos did indeed
betray their positions of trust, we also must recognize that the Sala del Crimen, in spite
of the shortage of escribanos, took decisive action once charges were filed and verified.
Protecting anyone who accused a judicial official of misconduct was the anonymity he or
she maintained during the probatory or sumaria phase of the investigation. See, AGN,
Ayuntamientos, vol. 222, exp. 2 and AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exp. 4, no folios.
69. According to the Rector of the Real CoUgio de Escribanos, the deputy scribes often
performed fee-based notarial transactions, lucrative judicial behavior that was contrary
to royal legislation and the 1782 enabling ordinance that limited their responsibilities to
criminal jurisdiction. AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exp. 3, no folios.
70. See, for instance, AGN, Criminal, vol. 89, exp. 1
71. For a sampling of such examples, see AGN, Criminal vol. 89, exp. 9; vol. 715, exp.
2; AJT, Penal, vol. 3, exp. 65; vol. 6, exp. 29.
7 2. One dimension of the sumaria illustrates this point. As st ipulated by law, the accused
did not have a right to review the other testimonies gathered in the course ofthe scribe's
preliminary investigation, although the defendant would be informed of the reason for
his or her imprisonment. Knowledge of these statements and their contents would occur
if the case is advanced to the next phase of the process, the pUnario, when a series of
judicial proofs would be offered to all parties. It should be kept in mind that the secrecy of
the probatory phase, as is the case for grand jury investigations in common law traditions,
was not an illegal abuse on the part ofthe authorities. Such judicial behavior was standard
practice since the Siete Partidas codified penal procedure and was inherent in the nature
of continental civil law judicial administration. Corvaldn and Castillo, Derecho Procesal
lndiano, 212; Tomas y Valiente, Gobierno e institucionesen la Espana, 229. Michel Foucault
discusses the ways in which the secretive nature ofthe preliminary investigation in French
criminal procedure ofthe ancien regimerepresents another "technology of power" the state
used to control and subjugate people charged with a crime. Discipline and Punish: The Birth
ofthe Prison (New York, 1995), 35-42.
73. Testifying under oath, especially in the confines of the sala de declaraciones in the
jail, certainly represented an inequality in power relations between the escribano and the
accused, but unlike the taking of statements in eighteenth-century French jails, prisoners
in Mexico City were not made to sit or kneel on uncomfortable chairs or stools (sellettes),
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and the municipal courts in the viceregai capital, unlike those of pre-Revolutionary Paris,
did not employ torture as a means of extracting confessions or statements. Richard Mowery
Andrews, Law, Magistracy and Crime in Old RegimeParis, 1735-1789. Vol. 1: The Criminal
Justice System (Cambridge, 1994), 429,441-466; Antoinette Wills, Crime and Punishment
in Revolutionary Paris (Westport, Conn., 1981), 6-9. Andrews does note, however, that
the incidence of investigative torture was declining in the late eighteenth century, 454.
The application of torture was permissible under Spanish law until prohibited by the
Constitution of 1812, and therefore would have been dutifully recorded in the criminal
files as were all judicial actions, but I did not find one instance of its use in over 7,000
cases. For supporting evidence, see Lozano Armendares, La criminalidad en k ciudad de
Mexico, 185 and Sanchez-Arcilla, "La Administracion de Justicia inferior en la Ciudad
de Mexico," 371-453.
74. For the historical and juridical basis of arbitrio judicial, see Tomas y Valiente, El
derecho penal de k monarquia absoluta, 295-317, 320, 331-352, 375-380; Corvaldn and
Castillo, Derecho Procesal Indiano, 156, 177-184, 193-231; Brundage, Medieval Canon
Law, 151-156. The fundamental principles of this judicial doctrine are expressed in
Partida VII of the Siete Partidas. For a discussion of the practice of arbitrio judicial in
Mexico City and provincial New Spain, see Sanchez-Arcilla, "La Administraci6n de
Justicia inferior en la Ciudad de M6xico," 371-453; Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern
New Spain, 35-43; Gonzalez and Lozano, "La administracion de justicia," 101-102; Mario
A. Tellez Gonzalez, La justicia criminal en el VaUe de Toluca, 1800-1829 (Zinacantepec,
2001), 177-186.
75. For a discussion of these criticisms of arbitriojudicial, see Buffington, Criminal and Cit?
izen in Modern Mexico, 12-21 and 111-119, Tellez Gonzalez, La justicia criminal en el VaUe
de Toluca, 177-178, and Fabio Lopez-Lazaro, "No Deceit Safe in Its Hiding Place: The
Criminal Trail in Eighteenth-Century Spain," Law and History Review 20 (2002), 449478. Sanchez-Arciila notes that the eminent Spanish legal historian Francisco Tomas
y Valiente also erroneously conflated arbitriojudicial with magisterial arbitrariness. "La
Administraci6n de Justicia inferior en la Ciudad de Mexico," 363-367 and 450-451.
Tomas y Valiente, El derecho penal de k monarquia absoluta, 376-389.
76. The perfunctory effort to eliminate the "excesses" associated with the pulque (puiquerias) and hard liquor taverns (vinaterias) is a typical example of the way in which
Mexico City's judicial officials modified laws and penalties. Generally, the local magis?
trates and police officials passively enforced government sanctions on drinking taverns,
and for those working class people who were arrested for such violations, the judges often
reduced the penalty stipulated in the laws. Michael C. Scardaville, "Alcohol Abuse and
Tavern Reform in Late Colonial Mexico City," Hispanic American Historical Review 60
(1980): 643-671.
77. The periodic conscriptions of alleged vagrants (levas de vagos) during the late 1790s
were an exception, however. Because of the need to quickly replenish vacant military
positions during wartime, one of the ministers of the Sak del Crimen, as mandated by
the Ordenanzas de Levas, streamlined normal criminal procedures. Although evidence
collected by the escribano was still required to substantiate the charge of vagrancy, there
were occasions when the royal prosecuting attorney (fiscal), as a form of plea-bargaining,
encouraged the accused to confess in order to reduce his sentence. See, for example,
AGN, Criminal, vol. 715, exp. 16.
78. For British historians, the ceremonial nature of eighteenth-century English criminal
courts, as public symbols of sovereign authority, conveys the power ofthe state. According
to E.P. Thompson, for instance, the "hegemony of the eighteenth-century gentry and
aristocracy was expressed, above all, not in military force, not in the mystincations of a
priesthood or ofthe press, not even in economic coercion, but in the rituals ofthe study
of the Justices of the Peace, in the quarter-sessions, in the pomp of the Assizes and in the
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theatre of Tyburn." Whigs and Hunters: The Origin ofthe Black Act (New York, 1976), 262.
For similar comments about the "majesty of law," see Dougias Hay, "Property, Authority
and the Criminal Law", in Dougias Hay, Peter Linebaugh. John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson,
and Cal Winslow, eds., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in EighteenthCentury Engjand
(New York, 1975), 120. North American scholars also have underscored the connection
between the ceremonial nature of American courts and maintenance of social order. See
Jacob, "Introduction," in Courts, Law, and PoUticsin Comparative Perspective, 12.
79. Historians are generally mistaken about the public nature of the criminal judicial
process in Bourbon Mexico. Contrary to what has been asserted by scholars of crime
in eighteenth-century New Spain, public trials and courthouses were not part of the
colonial Mexican legal system. For instance, see Haslip-Viera, Crime and Punishment in
Late Colonial Mexico City, 81.
80. The only opportunity for a magistrate to encounter prisoners under his jurisdiction
was during his weekly inspections ofthe jail, but, as previously noted, the majority ofthe
accused were sentenced and released in less than a week.
81. Civil cases also were handled bureaucratically through the submission of written
documents by the litigants. Corvalan and Castillo, Derecho Procesal lndiano, 83.
82. By "assured," I do not mean that respect for state authority was unchanging and
guaranteed. As becomes patently evident in Mexico during the post-1810 independence
era and following decades, public authority is always dependent on current developments
and consequently is in a constant state of interpretation and negotiation.
83. The literature on procedural justice has demonstrated a strong positive connection
in Western and non-western societies between the nature of the judicial process and
opinions about and acceptance of political and legal institutions. Lind and Tyler conclude that "judgements of process fairness were consistently the major factor involved
in generalizations from personal experience to system-level views." Although they use
terms like procedural justice and procedural fairness interchangeably, they "do not mean
to imply that cultures that lack concepts easily translatable as 'fairness' lack procedural
effect. We believe that whether violation of an entitlement is labeled 'unfair' or 'inappropriate' or 'impolite,' the psychological consequences are much the same." The Social
Psychobgy of ProceduralJustice, 3, 76-81, 129-145, 203-220.
84. He earned a 200-peso salary for his position as relator (official who prepares legal
briefs), a post that required scribe certification even though Espinosa was still classified
as an escribano habiUtado.He paid a price for the financial stability the position afforded.
In addition to his extensive institutional responsibilities, he also served as scribe to one
of the jueces mayores and to all four alcaldes de barrio in one of the major administrative
districts. The magistrate, Manuel Mariano de Blaya, who was a jurist by training, gave
Espinosa high marks for his professional conduct and knowledge. Espinosa continued to
work as a deputy scribe in different judicial capacities in the Sala del Crimen until 1820.
AGN, Criminal, vol. 625, exp. 5; AGN, Civil, vol. 2156, exp. 3; Arnold, Directorio de
burocratasen la ciudad de Mexico, 39.
85. Other tribunals in Mexico City, such as the Alumbrado, the Inquisition, the Indios,
and the Acordada, also behaved in a similar fashion. For case examples, see AJT, Librosde
reos, corregidor,1794, 1796, 1798; AGN, Criminal, vol. 84, exp. 11; vol. 641, exps. 6 and
7. Also see Borah, Justice by Insurance, 232-233; William F. Connell, "Transformation
of a Criminal Court in Mexico City: An Inquiry into the Real Tribunal de la Acordada,
1775-1812." M.A. thesis (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1997). As noted
previously, this moderate use of judicial power in the late colonial period also is evident
in the generally temperate sentences handed down by all courts.
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86. We should be sensitive to the fact that popular rejection of specific laws and gov?
ernment initiatives, which some ofthe urban poor viewed as inimical to their beliefs and
customs, did not invalidate a general acceptance of legal institutions.
87. My research on law enforcement suggests a more reactive urban constabulary than
has often been portrayed, a conclusion based in large part on detailed examination of
daily police practices. I do not find considerable evidence in the use of force and coercion
in the every day behavior ofthe akaldes de barrio, guardafaroleros(street lighting guards),
and other judicial agents in Mexico City.
88. I again stress the need to historicize our understanding of the legal system in par?
ticular and the colonial state in general. In attempting to examine the criminal justice
system, scholars must be wary of broad generalizations in terms of time and place as a
result of differing institutional, economic, and, demographic conditions. My study applies
specifically to late colonial Mexico City, but I ultimately hope to raise issues and processes
that can be explored in different contexts.
With this said, I should note as a preliminary point of comparison that courts in
some parts of rural New Spain, including those in the frontier provinces ofNew Mexico
and Texas, and in the Spanish colonies of Chile, Rio de la Plata, and Ecuador, display
a remarkable adherence to procedural norms in spite of the absence of trained jurists
and scribes. Perhaps these procedural similarities in vastly different and far-flung parts
of the Spanish American empire suggest a fairly broad understanding and acceptance of
Iberian legal norms throughout the colonies. This tentative conclusion clearly has to be
substantiated by more extensive examination of local court records in many parts ofNew
Spain and other regions of the Americas. Gonzalez and Lozano, "La administracion de
justicia," 88-105; Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain; Corvalan and Castillo,
Derecho Procesal Indiano, 42, 406-417; Zorraquin Becu, La funcion de justicia, 24; Tamar
Herzog, La administracion como un fenomino social: k justicia penal de k ciudad de Quito
(1650-1750) (Madrid, 1995), especially chapter 8.
Moreover, in a forthcoming article on this enduring colonial legal culture in the early
national period, I note that the introduction of modern constitutional forms of govern?
ment in the early nineteenth century did not alter basic colonial juridical principles. "Los
procesos judiciales y la autoridad del Estado: reflexiones en torno a la administracion de la
justicia criminal y la legitimidad en la ciudad de Mexico, desde fines de la Colonia hasta
principios del Mexico independiente," in Brian Connaughton, ed., Poder y Legitimidaden
Mexico, Siglo XIX. Instituciones y Cultura Politica (Mexico City, forthcoming).
89. Tomas y Valiente and Alonso Romero discuss the continuity of medieval and Haps?
burg legal principles under the Bourbons. El derechopenal de k monarquia absoluta, 93-112,
380, 407-408 and El proceso penal en Castilk, 317-335.
90. One of the best examples of the numerous late eighteenth-century legal reform
initiatives was the successful effort to eliminate the arbitrary procedural practices of the
Tribunal ofthe Acordada, a judicial institution created earlier in the century to deal swiftly
and, if necessary, severely with rural crime and banditry. MacLachlan, Criminal Justice in
Eighteenth Century Mexico, 71-74 and 84-87; Connell, "Transformation of a Criminal
Court in Mexico City." For the procedures the Acordada magistrates and escribanos were
required to follow after 1776, see, AGN, Acordada, vol. 9, fs. 180-195.
91. This understanding of what I call the "judicial state", and especially the operation
of the criminal justice system, is very much at odds with historians of crime in colonial
Mexico City who envision law as being largely coercive. They focus more on how the
state sustains domination by force, or threat to use force, than on how authority can
be created though cultural meanings. Legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, in her
critique of this one-dimensional view of law, explores the multi-faceted manner in which
law can establish support for authority. As she notes, "law exerts both coercive power and
subtle cultural domination." Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among
Working<kss Americans (Chicago, 1990), 8-11.

